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1. Introduction 
East Asia, the focus of the financial crisis of 1997, was a region
1 that had only 
recently achieved unparalleled economic development.  The conventional view has 
held that investor attitude, along with economic fundamentals, helped to cause the 
collapse.   Also coming in for analysis have been the mechanisms which could allow a 
country to suffer substantial successive damage after the crisis.       
However, our analysis – which used firm-level data on the East Asian area – 
indicated that the outbreak of the Asian crisis was followed not only by a generally 
negative impact on the performance of firms, but also by expanded cross-firm variation 
in performance.  This suggests that the effects of the Asian crisis were not necessarily 
uniform across the corporate sector.  Another possibility to be considered is that 
performance may have been influenced significantly by elements peculiar to individual 
firms. 
In this paper we focus on the corporate governance problems in a firm’s 
idiosyncratic elements.  We develop our argument around the close relationship of 
corporate governance problems, such as immaturity and inefficiency, to the Asian crisis.   
We use firm-level data from the five East Asian crisis economies of Indonesia, Korea, 
Malaysia, the Philippines, and Thailand to study the impact of corporate governance on 
the performance of firms.  We examine three aspects of corporate governance in 
particular.  We will now briefly summarize our findings on how these factors affected 
corporate performance during the crisis. 
The first aspect, ownership structure, is one of the key determinants of corporate 
governance.  We highlight the agency problem between large shareholders and 
minority shareholders, and measure it in terms of the ownership concentration of 
controlling shareholders and the divergence between the voting rights and cash flow 
rights of the controlling shareholders in the firm.  We find that in general, these two 
variables are associated with significantly worse performance during the Asian crisis. 
The second aspect is debt.  We examine two hypotheses here – the free-cash-flow 
hypothesis and the debt-overhang hypothesis.  We find that the debt-overhang 
hypothesis is supported in a very limited number of cases, and fail to detect a 
mechanism by which the free-cash-flow hypothesis asserts itself.  Rather, higher debt 
is associated with significantly worse corporate performance during the Asian crisis.  
This finding suggests that banks did not efficiently monitor the firms to which they lent 
their money, and that they tended to engage in “crony lending.” 
The last aspect is corporate diversification.  We investigate the effects of 
 2diversification on the performance of firms and find strong evidence that diversification 
worked to worsen performance during the crisis, perhaps because inefficiency involving 
diversification surfaced at that time. 
 
2. Macroeconomic and Microeconomic Theory on the Asian Financial Crisis 
 
2.1 Traditional Theory on the Asian Financial Crisis 
The causes of the Asian financial crisis of July 1997 have been analyzed mainly 
from the viewpoints of macroeconomics and international finance theory.  These 
theories form the basis for several explanations, such as mid-term acceleration of 
external debt (from the private as well as the public sector), an aggravation tendency 
among economic fundamentals, and panic fund recovery by some investors
2.  The  IMF 
is also accused of accelerating the crisis by insisting on conditionality involving major 
structural reform in the midst of the crisis.   
 
The mechanism of the Asian financial crisis 
Although there are several theoretical models that dealt with the mechanism of the 
currency crisis
3, we focus here on the contagion model. 
The characteristic feature of the Asian financial crisis is that currency collapsed 
simultaneously with the contraction of production.  Other conditions being equal, 
currency depreciation will enlarge external demand; this is not, however, observed here.   
The positive effect of relative price change on the demand side is offset completely by 
its negative effect on the supply side. 
Kiyotaki and Moore (1997), in analyzing a dynamic economy, demonstrate that in 
such an economy durable assets, such as land, play a dual role.  Not only are they 
factors of production, but they also serve as collateral for loans.  The dynamic 
interaction between credit limits and asset prices turns out to be a powerful transmission 
mechanism by which the effects of shocks persist, amplify, and spill over to other 
sectors.  The land collateral system equalizes the idiosyncratic features, such as 
differences in credit risk, possessed by individual firms.  While it makes external 
financing easier for firms, the system cannot serve as an effective barrier to a 
macroeconomic shock that influences land prices throughout the country.   
Miller and Stiglitz (1999) try to explain why the East Asian crisis worsened, using 
the collateralized borrowing model by Kiyotaki and Moore (1997), hereafter referred to 
as the KM model.  In their model, bankruptcy law and balance sheets play the same 
roles as land in the KM model.  Bankruptcy law is designed to solve problems of 
 3creditor coordination in the absence of contracts.    It aims to restructure credits so as to 
avoid premature liquidation and to divide up the assets in cases where liquidation is 
necessary.    In normal times, bankruptcy conveys a lot of information about the quality 
of a firm’s management and the firm’s long-term viability.  But in the context of a 
system-wide failure, little information is conveyed.  The mechanisms designed to 
handle small, idiosyncratic shocks simply cannot cope with a macroeconomic shock of 
this magnitude.  This is because when a large number of firms, say two-thirds of the 
firms in a country, are insolvent, there are no sufficient resources – human or pecuniary 
– to address each bankruptcy individually.  Moreover, the systemic nature of the 
bankruptcies makes sorting out net asset positions even more difficult than in normal 
situations, since the assets of bankrupt firms consist of claims on other firms that are 
also bankrupt.  A further problem is the difficulty of finding new managers or trustees 
to oversee all of the restructured firms.  In the context of the Asian crisis, therefore, 
even a well-managed firm could easily go bankrupt, simply because it failed to plan for 
a large-scale devaluation and a substantial rise in interest  rates.  It thus could generate 
large-scale connective bankruptcy as a result
4.  Miller and Stiglitz suggest that the 
Asian crisis had a serious, uniform influence on corporate sectors in the countries 
concerned. 
 
2.2 Is the Influence of the Asian Crisis Uniform? 
In this section, we use firm-level data to investigate whether the Asian crisis had a 
uniformly negative influence on each country’s corporate sector. 
 
Data description 
We collected financial data from the Worldscope database for all firms in Indonesia, 
Korea, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Thailand from 1994 until 2000.  The five 
countries suffered disproportionately in terms of currency depreciation and stock market 
decline (Mitton 2001).  We eliminate firms for which there is not sufficient data from 
1994 to 2000.    We exclude the period before 1994, as Worldscope covers little data for 
this period.  We eliminate firms that include an unusual value of financial variables 
even in one year
5.  This process is done twice, as after the first deletion we can still 
find unusual values included in the data set.  Data that exceed plus-or-minus three 
standard deviations from the average value are defined as unusual values.  By 
performing these processes we obtain a balanced data set
6.  
Since the crisis clearly began in July 1997, we compare a within-country deviation 
of performance index between firms before 1997 with that after 1997.    If the deviation 
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uniform and serious influence on the corporate sector of the  country  concerned.  If  the 
deviation grows larger after 1997, we will conclude that the Asian crisis had varied 
influences on the corporate sector in light of the idiosyncratic factors of each firm.    We 
use three typical performance indices of individual firms.    The first is ROA (the current 
return on firms’ total assets); the second is ROE (the net return on firms’ equity); and the 
third is PMA (the business profits-to-sales ratio). Summarized statistics for the three 
indexes are shown in Table 1.  We also include standard deviation, standard 
deviation/mean, and standard deviation/median in Table 1 as deviation indices.   
 
Enlarged deviation 
We differentiate Table 1 by performance indices.  A general deterioration 
tendency of performance can be observed after 1997 by mean and median.  However, 
by the indices characteristic, the deterioration of PMA is smaller than that of ROA and 
ROE.  Except for the Philippines, performance indices in all our sample countries are 
negative; the Philippines was comparatively stable during the crisis period both by 
mean and by median.   
The deviation enlarges after 1997 in general, although the extent of expansion varies 
by country and index.  The deviation indices for Indonesia, Thailand, and Korea 
showed particular expansion.  On the other hand, the expansion was comparatively 
smaller for Malaysia.  For the Philippines, standard deviation/mean, standard 
deviation/median expanded due to declining mean and median, but standard deviation 
did not. 
The result indicates that the Asian crisis had different influences on corporate 
sectors in light of the idiosyncratic factors of individual firms.  This contradicts any 
idea that the Asian crisis had a uniform influence on the corporate sector of a specific 
country. 
 
3. The Influence of the Asian Crisis Analyzed from the Viewpoint of Corporate 
Governance 
 
3.1 The Features and Problems of Family Control 
In the West and Japan, ownership of big firms is comparatively dispersed.  East 
Asian firms, even large ones, are generally owned by one family or by a group 
corporation under the family’s control. These families have close connections with the 
government and politicians, and dominate the national economy to a significant extent. 
 5Claessens, Djankov and Lang (2000) indicate that families control two-thirds of 
firms in Indonesia and Korea, over half in Malaysia and Thailand, and 40% in the 
Philippines
7.    To discuss corporate governance in East Asian firms, we have to take the 
family control problem into consideration. 
 
Ownership of firms and the agency problem   
One important issue in the organization of firms is how to solve or mitigate the 
agency problem that derives from asymmetric information
8.  But the problems that 
arise when firm ownership is dispersed are different than when it is concentrated.  
When ownership is dispersed, as in the US, conflicts of interest between managers and 
shareholders are the central problem.  When ownership is highly concentrated, as in 
the firms in East Asia, conflicts of interest between controlling shareholders and 
minority shareholders become the main problem.    As Shleifer and Vishny (1997) point 
out, controlling shareholders may not have a convergence of interests with minority 
shareholders.    A greater degree of control by controlling shareholders implies a greater 
ability to expropriate minority shareholders
9. 
 
Voting rights and cash flow rights 
Separation of voting rights and cash flow rights is another dominant view 
concerning the ownership structure of family-controlled firms in East Asia.  “Voting 
rights” refers the degree of control of a company, while “cash flow rights” refers to 
shareholdings in the firm.  If, for example, a family owns 60% of Firm A’s equities, 
and Firm A owns 30% of Firm B’s equities, the family owns 30% of the voting rights 
but only 18% of cash flow rights in Firm B. 
When voting rights and cash flow rights diverge, the agency problem between large 
shareholders and minority shareholders becomes more serious.  This is because when 
family-controlled firms suffer a loss, the family is required to pay only 18% for the loss, 
not 30%. 
 
Ultimate ownership structure 
Claessens, Djankov, and Lang (2000)
10 show that the widespread use of pyramidal 
ownership structures in East Asian firms allows insiders to exercise effective control 
over a company even when they own relatively few of its cash flow rights.  Pyramid 
structures
11 and cross-shareholdings are two of the ways in which families tend to 
control firms.    To clarify the ultimate ownership structures
12, therefore, we have to take 
pyramid structures and cross-shareholdings into consideration.   
 6Based on this view, we examine the link between ownership structure and firm 
performance during the crisis using firm-level data. 
 
Survey 
We discuss some relevant literature which focuses primarily on the relationship 
between the Asian crisis and corporate governance. 
Johnson, Boone, Breach and Friedman (2000) study country-level data and find that 
the extent of exchange rate depreciation and stock market performance decline are 
indeed correlated with aggregate measures of legal protection. 
Mitton (2001) studies five East Asian countries at the firm level and finds evidence 
that during the crisis period, firms with greater disclosure performed better than other 
firms; corporate diversification is associated with significantly worse performance; and 
the separation of cash flow rights and control rights did not affect firm performance to a 
significant extent. 
Lemmon and Lins (2001) study eight East Asian countries, also at the firm level, 
and find strong support for the view that firms with greater separation of cash flow 
rights and control rights performed worse than others. 
 
3.2 Examination of the Hypotheses concerning the Ownership Structure 
In this section, we examine whether firm-level differences in corporate governance 
can explain differences in corporate performance during the Asian crisis.  To that 
purpose, we match the initial sample of firms that we described in Section 2 with 
ownership data from Claessens, Djankov and Lang (2000) which contains data from the 
1995/1996-time period on control rights and cash flow rights.    To assess the impact of 
corporate governance variables on corporate performance during the crisis, we estimate 
the following model using the random effects method
13: 
PERit = a + b0 ×CGit + b1×CGit×D95 + b2×CGit×D96 + b3×CGit×D97 + b4×CGit×D98 
    + b5×CGit×D99 + b6×CGit×D00+ c×LTAit  + ∑dj×DINj   + uit  （１） 
in which the corporate governance variables included will change according to the 
specification, and other variables are defined as follows: 
PER: performance indices (that is ROA, ROE, PMA). 
     CG: corporate governance variables which will be indicated afterwards 
according to the specification. 
     D95～D00：year dummies. 
     LTA: natural logarithm of the book value of total assets 
      DIN: industry dummies (based on 4-digit SIC level)   
 7while  t is time unit; i is individual firm cross-section unit; j  is individual industry 
cross-section unit. 
Formula (1) aims at measuring how the impact of corporate governance variables on 
corporate performance changes over time, using total firm assets and industry dummies 
as control variables.  We particularly want to detect changes in the parameters 
concerning corporate governance variables just prior to and after the Asian crisis of 
1997
14.   
 
Concentration of ownership in firms 
As we have stated, family control and concomitant high ownership concentration 
are predominant in East Asian firms.    Claessens, Djankov and Lang (2000) find that at 
the end of 1996, the ratio of the voting rights of the largest shareholder to total voting 
rights is 10% for Japan, but 35% for Thailand, 34% for Indonesia, 28% for Malaysia, 
24% for the Philippines, and 18% for Korea. 
The following hypothesis is drawn by the existence of controlling shareholders who 
have substantial control and may actually expropriate minority shareholders when 
conflicts of interest exist between them: 
 
Hypothesis 1: The greater the ultimate control rights of the controlling 
shareholders, the more serious the agency problem between the controlling 
shareholders and minority shareholders, and the more inefficient the firm’s 
management.  Therefore, these kinds of firms should exhibit larger declines in 
performance than others during the crisis. 
 
We substitute the voting rights of the controlling shareholders of the firm (VR) for 
CG in formula (1) to investigate differences in the voting rights effect on performance 
before and after the crisis.   
Table 2 presents the regression results.  The coefficients on VR are positive and 
significant in Korea, Thailand and Malaysia for 1994, but not significantly different 
from zero in other countries.  The coefficients on VR for 1995 are not significantly 
different from those for 1994.  These results indicate that high ownership 
concentration may not have a negative effect on the performance of firms per se. 
However, the coefficients on VR after 1997 shift downward significantly in all 
specifications of all countries except the one in which the dependent variable is PMA in 
Indonesia.  The magnitude of the shift is largest in 1997 for Thailand, in 1998 for 
Indonesia, Korea and Malaysia, and in 1998 and 1999 for the Philippines.  And the 
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This result should be interpreted as indicating that higher ownership concentration is 
correlated with poorer performance during the crisis period, a deterioration that lasts 
right up until 2000.    This result is consistent with our hypothesis. 
 
Separation of voting rights and cash flow rights 
The separation of voting rights and cash flow rights is another consequence of a 
family-controlled ownership structure.  Claessens, Djankov and Lang (2000) find that 
compared with voting rights, cash flow rights are 20% less in Indonesia, 15% less in 
Korea and Malaysia, 10% less in the Philippines and 6% less in Thailand. 
If the separation of voting rights and cash flow rights has the potential to intensify 
the agency problem between controlling shareholders and other shareholders, then we 
hypothesize that: 
 
Hypothesis 2: The greater the separation of voting rights and cash flow rights, the 
greater the incentive for controlling shareholders to engage in expropriation and 
the more inefficient the firm’s management.  Therefore, firms of this sort should 
exhibit larger declines in performance than others during the crisis. 
 
We substitute difference of voting rights and cash flow rights (DI) of the firm for 
CG in formula (1) to assess how the effect on performance of the separation of voting 
rights and cash flow rights will differ before and after the crisis.    We eliminate firms in 
which there is no separation of voting rights and cash flow rights.    In doing so we can 
assess the data set including only those firms with a divergence between voting rights 
and cash flow rights. 
Table 3 presents the regression results.  The coefficients on DI are significantly 
positive only in some specifications of Malaysia and the Philippines before the crisis.  
This result is not evidence that the separation of voting rights and cash flow rights must 
negatively affect the performance of firms, at least before the crisis.  However, the 
coefficients on DI after 1997 significantly shift to negative in all specifications where 
the dependent variables are the ROA of all sample countries. But the coefficients on DI 
in the specifications where the dependent variables are ROE and PMA of Korea are not 
significant, neither are the coefficients on DI in 1997 significant in specifications where 
the dependent variables are ROE and PMA of Thailand, where separation of voting 
rights and cash flow rights is relatively smaller.   
This result is not identical in all specifications and all countries.  But most 
 9specifications proved that a greater separation of voting rights and cash flow rights is 
related with worse performance during the crisis period in countries where the 
separation of voting rights and cash flow rights is notably large
15.  
 
3.3 The Role Played by Debt 
In the previous section we analyzed the ownership structure effect which is the 
central issue regarding corporate governance in East Asian firms.  But other corporate 




The free-cash-flow hypothesis proposed by Jensen (1986, 1989) indicates that debt 
exerts disciplinary mechanisms on corporate management.  Excess cash flow can 
allow managers to pursue perquisite consumption for themselves.  Firms with debt, 
meanwhile, will manage more efficiently under the monitoring of their creditors. 
East Asian firms in general are more likely to run into a certain amount of debt than 
to have a surplus cash flow.  In fact, the average debt ratio (debt/total assets) of our 
sample firms at the end of 1996 was 51.3% for Indonesia, 75.0% for Korea, 44.8% for 
Malaysia, 39.8% for the Philippines and 57.1% for Thailand
16. 
The financial situation of East Asian firms suggests that we can expect debt to exert 
a disciplinary mechanism on corporate management if creditors monitor their debtors 
effectively. 
  
Hypothesis 3: Firms with greater debt would manage more efficiently if creditors 
effectively monitor their debtors; therefore, these kinds of firms perform better 
than the others during the crisis period. 
 
Debt-overhang hypothesis 
Regarding the role played by debt, however, the debt-overhang hypothesis
17 
suggests that firms with excessive debt have trouble attracting new investment even if 
they bring in a profit, because profits gained from the new investment would be 
appropriated first to the payment of existing debt. 
   
Hypothesis 4: Firms with excessive debt are likely to lapse into the problem of 
debt-overhang, lose opportunities to make new profits, and therefore become more 
fragile during the crisis.   
 10 
These two hypotheses are contradictory regarding the role of debt.  The 
free-cash-flow hypothesis suggests that debt has a positive effect on firm performance.  
The debt-overhang hypothesis, on the contrary, points to the negative effect of excessive 
debt. 
We substitute one-period previous debt ratio (DA-1) of the firm for CG into formula 
(1) to examine the relationship between debt’s disciplinary mechanism and the crisis. 
Then we group our sample firms into three sub samples based on the firms’ debt ratio in 
1996
18. We define the firms with the lowest 20% of debt ratio as low debt ratio firms; 
those with the highest 20% as high debt ratio firms.  We examine the debt-overhang 
hypothesis by comparing the regression result of these two sub samples.   
Table 4 presents the regression results.  Panel A of Table 4 assesses whether debt 
has a positive effect on performance as suggested by the free-cash-flow hypothesis.               
The coefficients on debt ratio are significantly positive for 1994 in all specifications in 
Thailand, two specifications in the Philippines, and one specification where the 
dependent variable is ROE in Malaysia.  This result is consistent with what the 
free-cash-flow hypothesis suggests, although we cannot find similar results for 
Indonesia or Korea.  After 1997, however, the coefficients on debt ratio become 
significantly negative in most specifications.    These findings show that the disciplinary 
effect of debt becomes weaker, but still appears slightly in some specifications in 
Thailand and the Philippines.    But most specifications provide evidence that debt has a 
negative effect on corporate performance that is contrary to the free-cash-flow 
hypothesis
19.  
We examine the debt-overhang hypotheses by comparing both the magnitude and 
significance of coefficients on debt ratio of low debt ratio firms (Panel B) and high debt 
ratio firms (Panel C).  We find no significant coefficients for low debt ratio firms in 
specifications where dependent variables are ROA and ROE  in the Philippines.  
Coefficients are significantly negative for high debt ratio firms, however, and the 
magnitude of coefficients becomes larger after the crisis.  These findings suggest that 
debt-overhang problems occurred in high debt ratio firms of the Philippines.  We find 
no evidence that debt-overhang problems occurred in other countries.  In other words, 
excessive debt has not necessarily had the negative influence on performance that the 
debt-overhang hypothesis suggests. 
These results are contrary to the free-cash-flow hypothesis and partly consistent 
with the debt-overhang hypothesis.  They suggest that excessive debt did not 
necessarily have a negative effect on performance, but rather that the funds raised by 
 11debt were used inefficiently, due to a lack of necessary skills, or a flawed monitoring 
system on the part of creditors, that prevented the disciplinary mechanism from working 
effectively.    These facts might imply the moral hazard problem of crony lending – that 
lending by family-controlled banks went predominantly to firms controlled by the same 
family, that is the exposure of crony lending
20 
 
3.4 Effects of Corporate Diversification 
While it is not a direct corporate governance mechanism, corporate diversification 
could affect the expropriation problem and the effectiveness of corporate governance in 
the following ways.   
First, diversified firms offer more opportunities for expropriation through 
misallocation of capital, such as cross-subsidization and over-investment.  Second, 
diversification may hinder corporate governance simply because of the complexity it 
creates.  The complexity of an organization can increase the level of asymmetric 
information.    Expropriation may be more likely if it is more difficult to detect.    Third, 
benefits might accrue to conglomerates, particularly in countries where capital markets 
are less developed.  Diversification is beneficial in emerging markets, because 
conglomerates can perform through internal markets that allow greater access to capital 
needed to pursue worthwhile investments.    The benefits of diversification are related to 
capital market development. 
 
Benefits and costs of diversification 
Whether corporate diversification benefits or harms firm valuation is a main concern 
in corporate theory.  Chandler, Jr. (1977, 1990) indicates that diversification is 
beneficial theoretically when merits exist in the profit or cost side, in economies of 
scope for example.    Benefits might accrue to diversification to a firm particularly when 
the know-how of one industry can be exploited in other industries, or when a firm is a 
multidivisional structure part of which can be shared inside conglomerates. Lewellen 
(1971) also indicates that conglomerates are favorable because it saves taxes with more 
access to external debt whose interest payments are income deductible. Moreover, Stein 
(1997) suggests that conglomerates might achieve more efficient management by 
allocating capital efficiently through an internal capital market. 
Much of the literature, however, emphasizes the negative rather than the positive 
effects of diversification.  Berger and Ofek (1995) and Rajan, Servaes and Zingales 
(2000) point to the inefficiency of cross-subsidization; Jensen (1986) stresses the evils 
of investing in projects that are not expected to turn a profit; and Scharfstein and Stein 
 12(2000) find that rent-seeking activities by the division managers of conglomerates cause 
distortion in internal capital markets. 
Empirical analyses of American firms find that corporate diversification harms firm 
valuation where, as in the United States, the problems of cross-subsidization, over- 
investment and inefficient allocation of capital predominate.  These studies suggest 
that diversification is negatively related to efficiency as a consequence of over- 
investment
21.  




Hypothesis 5: Diversified firms exhibit more inefficient management than others.  
Therefore, these kinds of firms should show relatively larger declines in firm 
performance during the crisis. 
 
We substitute the numbers of segments (NS) used to measure diversification levels 
for CG into formula (1) to investigate how the diversification effect on performance will 
change before and after the crisis.  We also describe the average diversification levels 
from Worldscope information as 3.5 for Indonesia, 3.4 for Korea, 5.0 for Malaysia, 3.4 
for the Philippines and 2.7 for Thailand. 
Table 5 presents the regression results.    The coefficients on NS have a significantly 
positive effect on performance in the Philippines and Korea in 1994, but do not show 
any significant effect in other countries.  This result does not indicate that 
diversification has a negative effect on corporate performance, at least before the crisis.   
However the coefficients on NS around 1997 have a significantly negative effect on 
performance in all countries, and this negative influence lasts right up until 2000. 
Overall findings should be interpreted as follows: Diversification resulted in wrongs 
and inefficiencies that surfaced during the crisis.    This is similar to Japan’s experience, 
where diversification advanced during the bubble period but proved a serious constraint 
on corporate management after the bubble collapsed.   
 
4 Conclusion 
Using firm-level data on East Asia, we have shown that cross-firm variation in 
performance expanded after the outbreak of the Asian crisis.  Much of the disparities 
between firms can be explained by corporate governance problems among each firm’s 
idiosyncratic elements. 
Based on firm-level analysis, this paper suggests that ownership concentration 
 13 14
                                                 
enabling controlling shareholders to expropriate other shareholders;  fund raising 
through debt that is short of effective monitoring by creditors; and inefficiency caused 
by the ill effects of diversification are all associated with significantly worse 
performance during the Asian crisis. 
The region’s predominant governance structure, characterized by family control and 
conglomerates, was considered a factor in its miraculous economic development but has 
been seen since the crisis as the origin of crony capitalism
23.  We find evidence 
consistent with this view. 
Many subjects remain for further research.    The first is the causality issue: Did the 
crisis expose corporate governance problems, or did corporate governance problems 
trigger the onset of the crisis?  Other exogenous factors may have brought out the 
problems of corporate governance and the crisis.  The causality is unknown in our 
analysis.  
Second, the analysis in this paper did not encompass such country-specific 
institutional characteristics as corporate law, bankruptcy codes, corporate accounting 
standards, and corporate finance, which are important factors in regulating the rights 
and actions of investors and creditors.   
Third, we did not provide enough analysis of the issue’s political implications.  
Corporate governance showed many problems deriving from a lack of transparency in 
corporate management, the lack of sufficiently fair and efficient financial and capital 
markets, and weak property rights.  These institutional vulnerabilities should be 
checked and corrected.  However little literature documents the quantitative effect of 
reform
24. 
Our next endeavor is to deepen the economic understanding of corporate 






1 Refer to World Bank (1993).  Regarding the reconsideration after the crisis, refer to 
Stiglitz, Yusuf (eds.) (2001). 
 
2  Refer to Corsetti, Pesenti and Roubini (1999) and Stiglitz(2000) for the details. 
 
3 For example, a model based on fundamentals (the first generation model) presented 
by Krugman (1979); a self-fulfilling speculative attacks model based on expectations of 
the private sector (the second generation model) by Obstfeld(1994); a crisis model by 
Goldfajn and Valdes (1997) analyzing the fragility of the banking sector as the cause of  15
 
crisis (the third generation model). 
 
4 They show that crisis management can, in principle, avert collapse in two ways: 
through forced debt rollovers in the short run; and ultimately through debt write 
downs. 
 
5  We also try to calculate deviation of performance indices including the unusual 
values from 1989 to 2000 and from 1994 to 2000 respectively.    The results are 
qualitatively similar to those in Table 1.    For simplicity, we only report results without 
unusual value.   
 
6  Our database ends up having 564 companies for ROA, 558 companies for ROE, 615 
companies for PMA with a total of 2,014 companies in the 5 countries covered by 
Worldscope. Broken down by economies, the sample covers 73 of 220 Indonesian 
companies, 136 of 775 Korean companies, 159 of 541 Malaysian companies, 46 of 188 
Philippine companies, 150 of 290 Thai companies for ROA; and the sample covers 57 of 
220 Indonesian companies, 144 of 775 Korean companies, 166 of 541 Malaysian 
companies, 40 of 188 Philippine companies, 151 of 290 Thai companies for ROE; and 
the sample covers 69 of 220 Indonesian companies, 164 of 775 Korean companies, 178 
of 541 Malaysian companies, 40 of 188 Philippine companies, 164 of 290 Thai 
companies for PMA. Worldscope covers most of the listed companies in each country, for 
example, Worldscope provides the financial information for 750 of the total 857 Korean 
listed companies in 2003.   
 
7 The calculation is based on a fixed cutoff of 10% ownership requirement.  The 
calculation provides similar results even with a cutoff of 20%. 
 
8  See Jensen and Meckling (1976). 
 
9 There are several ways in which controlling shareholders might gain enough power 
to pursue objectives that may not coincide with the profit of the firm, at the expense of 
minority shareholders.  They might use their control to link the business to other 
affiliated firms in which they hold shares.    When the manager of the firm is a member 
of the controlling shareholders’ family, the controlling shareholders might cause the 
firm’s profits to be used inefficiently to enhance the manager’s interest.  Alternatively, 
they might purchase shares in troubled affiliated firms at artificially high prices as a 
form of bailout.  Johnson, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes and Shleifer (2000) define as 
“tunneling” the actions of controlling shareholders to use their control to transfer 
resources away from the firm, and indicate that these actions have been carried out 
legally as well as illegally.  Moreover, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny 
(2000), as well as Faccio, Lang and Young (2001), study the relationship between 
expropriation and dividends, and provide an empirical analysis on whether dividends 
are raised when minority shareholders have adequate institutional protection.     
 
10  Wiwattanakantang (2001), Khanthavit, Plsiri and Wiwattanakantang (2002) provide 
a detailed analysis on Thailand. 
 
11  See Obata(2001) for examples of group firms with a pyramid structure in East Asia. 
 
12 The study by La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes and Shleifer (1999) is the first to look at 
ultimate ownership structure in many firms throughout the world.  16
 
 
13 We also performed Hausman test (Hausman 1978) against the each model of 
Hypothesis 3, 4 and 5, and could not reject the null hypothesis in all cases except for 
the specifications where dependent variables are ROE in Indonesia, ROA and ROE in 
Korea, ROA in Malaysia, ROA, ROE and PMA in the Philippine, ROE in Thailand for 
Hypothesis 3; for the specifications where dependent variables are ROE in Indonesia, 
ROA and ROE in Korea, ROE in Thailand for Hypothesis 5.   
 
14 From formula (1), it is obvious that b0 is the coefficient on CG for 1994, b1 is the 
difference between the same coefficient for 1994 and 1995, b2 is the difference between 
the same coefficient for 1994 and 1996,….., and b6 is the difference between the same 
coefficient for 1994 and 2000. 
 
15 Our result is consistent with that of Obata (2001), who focuses on the relationship 
between firm value and the separation of cash flow rights and voting rights, and 
presents that the negative effect of the separation on firm value is predominant during 
the financial crisis, although it cannot be observed in normal times. 
 
16 The debt ratios of East Asian firms are not particularly high compared with the 
average debt ratio of listed firms in Japan in 1996 (72.1%) as reported by the financial 
data bank of the Japan Policy and Investment Bank. 
 
17  See Myers (1977), Myers and Majluf (1984).   
 
18  The average debt ratio of low debt ratio firms as well as high debt ratio firms in each 
country at the end of 1996 is as following: 
                       high debt ratio firms        low debt ratio firms 
Indonesia   74.5%     22.6% 
Korea    93.9%     52.4% 
Malaysia   76.3%     13.4% 
The  Philippines   81.9%     4.9% 
Thailand    83.6%        28.7%           
 
19 Among the three performance indices, ROE is directly influenced by debt level 
because of inclusion of after-tax profit in its numerator, however ROA and PMA are not 
directly influenced by debt level because they encompass before-tax profit in their 
numerators. 
 
20 See Laeven (2001), La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes and Zamarripa (2002) as well as 
Wiwattanakantang, Kali and Charumillind (2002) about moral hazard problem caused 
by crony lending. 
 
21 See Berger and Ofek (1995), Lang and Stulz (1994), Comment and Jarrell (1995), 
Servaes (1996), Denis, Denis and Sarin (1997), Shin and Stulz (1998), Denis, Denis and 
Yost (2002), Mansi and Reeb (2002) 
 
22  Claessens, Djankov, Fan and Lang (2001), and Mitton (2001) study diversification in 
the East Asian firms, and show that diversified firms perform worse than other firms 
owing to inefficiency caused by diversification. However, Khanna and Palepu (2000) 




23  See Krugman (1998). 
 
24 In a similar vein, Fan and Wong (2000) analyse the effect on performance firms of 
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Table 1 Summary Statistics of Performance Indices  
1. ROA                                 
        94  95  96  97  98  99  2000 
Indonesia  Number of firms  73  73  73  73  73  73  73 
    Mean  9.35  9.44  7.76  0.56  -2.14  9.22   1.15  
    Min  -2.31  -6.40  -6.87  -32.35  -63.65  -18.94   -43.91  
    Max  26.36  26.14  22.83  26.54  66.91  44.42   42.69  
    Median  8.53  8.92  7.44  3.32  0.79  7.52   3.02  
   Standard deviation  5.61  5.22  5.17  11.74  23.30  12.05   17.25  
   Standard deviation/Mean  0.60  0.55  0.67  20.98  -10.90  1.31   15.05  
   Standard deviation/Median  0.66  0.58  0.70  3.53  29.63  1.60   5.70  
                          
Korea  Number of firms  136  136  136  136  136  136  136 
    Mean  5.27  5.27  3.38  2.56  1.37  4.31   3.60  
    Min  -1.63  -0.09  -6.14  -9.80  -29.29  -18.80   -29.79  
    Max  12.33  12.97  12.57  8.83  16.05  26.76   31.55  
    Median  5.44  5.33  3.97  3.36  4.18  5.09   3.74  
   Standard deviation  2.62  2.53  3.09  3.43  8.24  6.74   9.66  
   Standard deviation/Mean  0.50  0.48  0.92  1.34  6.00  1.57   2.69  
   Standard deviation/Median  0.48  0.48  0.78  1.02  1.97  1.33   2.58  
                          
Malaysia  Number of firms  159  159  159  159  159  159  159 
  Mean  9.29  8.51  8.20  5.55  1.80  3.18   2.46  
  Min  -3.55  -5.82  -6.12  -13.77  -31.46  -35.00   -19.69  
  Max  29.96  29.11  30.21  24.33  28.06  30.92   25.25  
  Median  8.33  8.17  7.50  4.94  2.31  3.28   2.41  
  Standard deviation  5.89  5.54  5.57  6.26  8.54  8.93   6.08  
  Standard deviation/Mean  0.63  0.65  0.68  1.13  4.74  2.81   2.47  
   Standard deviation/Median  0.71  0.68  0.74  1.27  3.69  2.72   2.52  
                          
Philippines  Number of firms  46  46  46  46  46  46  46 
  Mean  8.41  7.36  6.48  4.89  3.07  1.84   2.29  
  Min  -7.81  -6.44  -9.98  -7.76  -22.41  -10.49   -12.90  
  Max  26.98  27.87  23.99  21.59  24.79  14.22   14.63  
  Median  6.35  5.56  4.29  3.50  2.31  1.00   2.58  
  Standard deviation  8.28  7.48  7.44  5.02  7.64  5.25   5.21  
  Standard deviation/Mean  0.98  1.02  1.15  1.03  2.49  2.85   2.28  
   Standard deviation/Median  1.30  1.35  1.73  1.44  3.31  5.25   2.02  
                          
Thailand  Number of firms  150  150  150  150  150  150  150 
  Mean  8.59  7.97  6.09  -8.16  5.41  2.79   4.48  
  Min  -9.27  -4.65  -4.56  -50.73  -24.51  -24.00   -24.92  
  Max  25.88  20.62  19.71  24.25  29.72  24.28   31.41  
  Median  8.19  7.55  5.92  -4.39  5.93  3.38   4.66  
  Standard deviation  5.75  4.70  4.25  15.84  9.63  8.27   8.76  
  Standard deviation/Mean  0.67  0.59  0.70  -1.94  1.78  2.97   1.96  
   Standard deviation/Median  0.70  0.62  0.72  -3.61  1.62  2.45   1.88  














Table 1 Summary Statistics of Performance Indices (Continued) 
 
2. ROE 
                       
        94  95  96  97  98  99  2000 
Indonesia  Number of firms  57  57  57  57  57  57  57 
  Mean  15.33  14.61  13.47  1.07  -22.49  21.36   1.48 
  Min  -5.82  0.74  -12.50  -28.68  -417.62  -244.98   -132.70 
  Max  44.85  39.75  35.09  24.69  89.41  128.30   128.24 
  Median  14.14  13.82  13.03  1.76  -0.80  15.31   7.76 
  Standard deviation  10.57  8.58  9.76  9.57  83.90  54.04   40.97 
  Standard deviation/Mean  0.69  0.59  0.72  8.96  -3.73  2.53   27.66 
   Standard deviation/Median  0.75  0.62  0.75  5.43  -105.17  3.53   5.28 
                          
Korea  Number of firms  144  144  144  144  144  144  144 
    Mean  7.58  6.08  -0.28  -3.99  -15.59  -3.30   -6.49 
    Min  -25.73  -35.54  -30.65  -80.14  -323.06  -426.15   -302.06 
    Max  46.26  44.73  25.70  10.29  502.25  374.82   131.76 
    Median  6.58  6.20  2.39  -0.31  -0.90  7.75   3.39 
   Standard deviation  7.82  8.87  9.34  12.05  94.60  79.54   59.55 
   Standard deviation/Mean  1.03  1.46  -33.41  -3.02  -6.07  -24.10   -9.18 
   Standard deviation/Median  1.19  1.43  3.92  -38.79  -104.61  10.27   17.57 
                          
Malaysia  Number of firms  166  166  166  166  166  166  166 
  Mean  14.34  14.81  13.05  7.70  -0.57  3.58   3.23 
  Min  -7.94  -13.82  -16.97  -31.03  -62.15  -71.87   -111.78 
  Max  47.29  47.96  41.21  40.10  58.65  108.31   109.76 
  Median  12.81  14.24  12.20  7.05  1.42  5.50   3.58 
  Standard deviation  10.40  9.61  9.68  10.57  13.75  26.72   23.86 
  Standard deviation/Mean  0.73  0.65  0.74  1.37  -24.33  7.47   7.39 
   Standard deviation/Median  0.81  0.67  0.79  1.50  9.67  4.86   6.66 
                          
Philippines  Number of firms  40  40  40  40  40  40  40 
  Mean  15.16  10.71  9.10  4.54  2.09  0.63   2.35 
  Min  -17.36  -11.78  -17.38  -15.05  -51.22  -53.20   -29.23 
  Max  54.18  32.84  34.08  16.97  51.40  39.61   51.17 
  Median  12.19  11.99  10.81  4.17  1.97  2.48   2.17 
  Standard deviation  15.67  9.75  11.48  7.46  17.66  15.23   12.77 
  Standard deviation/Mean  1.03  0.91  1.26  1.64  8.45  24.01   5.44 
   Standard deviation/Median  1.29  0.81  1.06  1.79  8.97  6.14   5.89 
                          
Thailand  Number of firms  151  151  151  151  151  151  151 
  Mean  17.91  13.93  10.26  0.65  1.93  1.08   1.76 
  Min  -38.07  -21.87  -21.30  -37.52  -334.84  -290.30   -172.97 
  Max  76.20  51.86  45.52  38.59  264.36  412.36   118.43 
  Median  17.62  13.20  9.37  1.35  7.86  2.97   5.72 
  Standard deviation  15.00  11.28  10.38  12.74  72.65  76.64   36.02 
  Standard deviation/Mean  0.84  0.81  1.01  19.66  37.66  70.74   20.41 















Table 1 Summary Statistics of Performance Indices (Continued) 
3 .   P M A                              
        94  95  96  97  98  99  2000 
Indonesia  Number of firms  69  69  69  69  69  69  69 
  Mean  14.95  14.97  13.17  12.47  13.03  10.00   9.75  
  Min  1.29  0.32  -9.33  -14.40  -106.56  -62.28   -60.12  
  Max  34.57  42.02  35.15  36.47  54.07  37.48   37.70  
  Median  13.80  13.72  12.79  12.43  13.72  12.08   11.04  
  Standard deviation  8.38  9.21  9.42  10.22  19.50  16.88   15.76  
  Standard deviation/Mean  0.56  0.62  0.71  0.82  1.50  1.69   1.62  
   Standard deviation/Median  0.61  0.67  0.74  0.82  1.42  1.40   1.43  
                          
Korea  Number of firms  164  164  164  164  164  164  164 
    Mean  7.57  6.62  5.45  5.37  0.89  5.38   5.45  
    Min  -4.42  -1.70  -9.57  -23.96  -118.09  -28.22   -54.27  
    Max  24.00  19.59  18.10  20.93  25.47  32.78   48.35  
    Median  7.12  5.87  5.53  5.89  5.29  5.91   5.95  
   Standard deviation  4.72  4.49  4.42  6.40  16.62  8.17   10.59  
   Standard deviation/Mean  0.62  0.68  0.81  1.19  18.75  1.52   1.94  
   Standard deviation/Median  0.66  0.77  0.80  1.09  3.14  1.38   1.78  
                          
Malaysia  Number of firms  178  178  178  178  178  178  178 
  Mean  15.81  16.57  15.96  14.51  7.34  6.29   6.80  
  Min  -16.49  -25.15  -18.40  -24.44  -69.67  -107.29   -45.12  
  Max  52.64  60.99  62.29  62.40  58.05  61.79   47.64  
  Median  14.02  13.65  13.38  12.14  6.93  7.34   7.17  
  Standard deviation  11.38  13.12  12.97  12.45  18.09  22.53   15.44  
  Standard deviation/Mean  0.72  0.79  0.81  0.86  2.46  3.58   2.27  
   Standard deviation/Median  0.81  0.96  0.97  1.03  2.61  3.07   2.15  
                          
Philippines  Number of firms  40  40  40  40  40  40  40 
  Mean  21.25  21.39  19.93  19.06  12.26  11.87   13.64  
  Min  1.61  0.20  -0.81  -37.00  -29.71  -31.22   -41.35  
  Max  55.13  51.44  51.79  57.75  57.29  64.59   62.44  
  Median  17.01  17.27  16.44  16.02  10.36  10.33   10.63  
  Standard deviation  13.55  14.01  15.20  17.71  17.01  19.08   17.36  
  Standard deviation/Mean  0.64  0.65  0.76  0.93  1.39  1.61   1.27  
   Standard deviation/Median  0.80  0.81  0.92  1.11  1.64  1.85   1.63  
                          
Thailand  Number of firms  164  164  164  164  164  164  164 
  Mean  13.14  12.16  10.09  5.57  1.35  1.38   5.24  
  Min  -22.48  -21.25  -28.09  -36.24  -79.92  -113.10   -45.53  
  Max  47.71  47.29  42.39  48.60  42.80  47.18   67.55  
  Median  12.37  10.24  9.78  6.25  4.15  5.84   5.44  
  Standard deviation  11.38  11.31  10.82  13.27  19.08  22.77   14.78  
  Standard deviation/Mean  0.87  0.93  1.07  2.38  14.09  16.51   2.82  
   Standard deviation/Median  0.92  1.10  1.11  2.12  4.59  3.90   2.72  















Table 2 The Effect of Ownership Concentration on Performance 
 
(1) Indonesia                 
Dependent Variables     R O A         ROE        PMA      
    Coefficient    Z-Value     Coefficient   Z-Value     Coefficient    Z-Value    
Ownership concentration (VR)  0.07     0.51      -0.14    -0.08      -0.09       -1.14   
VR*D95  0.01     0.24      -0.04    -0.17      -0.01     -0.23   
VR*D96  -0.02     -0.32      -0.07    -0.33      -0.02     -0.44   
VR*D97  -0.18     -2.88 ***  -0.43    -1.81 *  -0.03     -0.46   
VR*D98  -0.20     -3.02 *** -0.75    -2.93 *** 0.03     0.54   
VR*D99  0.09     1.33      0.09    0.36      -0.09     -1.57   
VR*D00  -0.13     -1.83 *  -0.54    -2.01 ** -0.08     -1.28   
Log (total assets) (LTA)  -1.63     -1.17      2.43    0.41    -1.55     -1.41   
Intercept  27.11     1.36      -0.75    -0.01      38.07       2.52  **
Overall R-squared  0.441   0.244   0.506  
Number of observations(Number of firms)  392(56)  294(42)  336(48) 
                
(2) Korea                 
Dependent Variables     R O A         ROE          PMA      
    Coefficient    Z-Value     Coefficient   Z-Value     Coefficient    Z-Value    
Ownership concentration (VR)  0.12     2.24 ** 0.18    0.47      0.17     2.32 **
VR*D95  -0.01     -0.21      -0.05    -0.14      -0.05     -1.17   
VR*D96  -0.10     -2.74 *** -0.32    -0.93      -0.11     -2.34 **
VR*D97  -0.13     -3.63 *** -0.44    -1.27      -0.10     -2.19 **
VR*D98  -0.16     -4.42 *** -0.93    -2.68 *** -0.29     -6.09 ***
VR*D99  -0.05     -1.24      -0.40    -1.15      -0.09     -1.97 **
VR*D00  -0.08     -2.11 ** -0.34    -0.97      -0.07     -1.54   
Log (total assets) (LTA)  0.75     2.25 ** -1.43    -0.63    1.49     3.35 ***
Intercept  -6.73     -1.15      20.01    0.50      -12.48       -1.62   
Overall R-squared  0.206   0.107   0.280  
Number of observations(Number of firms)  777(111)  805(115)  812(116) 
                
(3) Malaysia                 
Dependent Variables     R O A         ROE          PMA      
    Coefficient    Z-Value     Coefficient   Z-Value     Coefficient    Z-Value    
Ownership concentration (VR)  0.01     0.09      0.26    2.00 ** 0.40     2.28 **
VR*D95  0.01     0.38      0.03    0.42      0.01     0.23   
VR*D96  0.02     0.80      0.01    0.10      0.03     0.45   
VR*D97  -0.02     -0.81      -0.14    -1.85 *  -0.01     -0.20   
VR*D98  -0.13     -4.63 *** -0.40    -5.22 *** -0.21     -3.22 ***
VR*D99  -0.11     -3.85 *** -0.30    -3.95 *** -0.23     -3.56 ***
VR*D00  -0.11     -3.96 *** -0.17    -2.19 ** -0.24     -3.66 ***
Log (total assets) (LTA)  -1.74     -2.95 *** 0.46    0.39    1.34     1.02   
Intercept  27.48     4.73  *** 3.78    0.32      -7.54       -0.50   
Overall R-squared  0.432   0.319   0.401  
Number of observations(Number of firms)  560(80)  595(85)  602(86) 
                
(4) Philippines                 
Dependent Variables     R O A         ROE          PMA      
    Coefficient    Z-Value     Coefficient   Z-Value     Coefficient    Z-Value    
Ownership concentration (VR)  0.16     1.10      0.26    1.06      -0.18     -0.62   
VR*D95  -0.03     -0.45      -0.20    -1.64      0.03     0.29   
VR*D96  -0.09     -1.47      -0.36    -2.91 *** -0.06     -0.56   
VR*D97  -0.15     -2.41 ** -0.54    -4.32 *** -0.10     -0.96   
VR*D98  -0.29     -4.57 *** -0.72    -5.70 *** -0.44     -4.01 ***
VR*D99  -0.30     -4.68 *** -0.71    -5.57 *** -0.43     -3.93 ***
VR*D00  -0.27     -4.23 *** -0.68    -5.25 *** -0.32     -2.81 ***
Log (total assets) (LTA)  -0.02     -0.03      1.75    1.37      -0.75     -0.51   
Intercept  19.31     2.52  ** -5.97    -0.48      46.78     2.96  ***
Overall R-squared  0.456   0.513   0.644  
Number of observations(Number of firms)  280(40)  252(36)  245(35) 
                
(5) Thailand                 
Dependent Variables     R O A         ROE          PMA      
    Coefficient    Z-Value     Coefficient   Z-Value     Coefficient    Z-Value    
Ownership concentration (VR)  0.30     2.97 *** 0.21    0.64      0.09     0.70   
VR*D95  -0.03     -0.61      -0.09    -0.47      -0.03     -0.40   
VR*D96  -0.07     -1.52      -0.14    -0.71      -0.07     -0.97   
VR*D97  -0.51     -10.82 *** -0.46    -2.27 ** -0.16     -2.29 **
VR*D98  -0.10     -2.06 ** -0.19    -0.93      -0.33     -4.66 ***
VR*D99  -0.15     -3.21 *** -0.68    -3.37 *** -0.39     -5.44 ***
VR*D00  -0.13     -2.84 *** -0.33    -1.64      -0.21     -2.93 ***
Log (total assets) (LTA)  0.59     0.56      -1.22    -0.35    -1.93     -1.22   
Intercept  -14.99     -1.58      12.48    0.36      20.23       1.31   
Overall R-squared  0.434   0.202   0.398  
Number of observations(Number of firms)  406(58)  427(61)  462(66) 
(Note 1), regression results of Industry dummies as explanatory variables have been omitted.             








   
Table 3 The Effect of Separation of voting rights and cash flow rights on Performance 
 (1) Indonesia               
Dependent Variables  R O A        ROE          PMA     
    Coefficient   Z-Value     Coefficient   Z-Value     Coefficient    Z-Value   
Separation of voting rights and cash flow rights (DI)  -0.09    -0.17      0.06    0.02      0.38       0.92   
DI*D95  0.08    0.45      0.10    0.15      -0.00    -0.01   
DI*D96  0.09    0.52      0.14    0.21      0.00     0.00   
DI*D97  -0.29    -1.54      -0.63    -0.89      0.10     0.55   
DI*D98  -0.47    -2.40 ** -1.51    -2.06 **  0.29     1.52   
DI*D99  0.35    1.81 *  0.52    0.71      -0.01     -0.05   
DI*D00  -0.12    -0.59      -0.77    -1.02      -0.03     -0.14   
Log (total assets) (LTA)  -3.05    -1.77 *  -1.69    -0.23      -2.21     -1.37   
Intercept  50.00    1.69  *  40.89    0.32      29.62     1.10   
Overall R-squared  0.404   0.220   0.451  
Number of observations(Number of firms)  238(34)  182(26)  196(28) 
              
(2) Korea               
Dependent Variables      R O A        ROE          PMA     
    Coefficient   Z-Value     Coefficient   Z-Value     Coefficient    Z-Value   
Separation of voting rights and cash flow rights (DI)  0.32    0.90      0.46    0.25      2.82     0.53   
DI*D95  -0.03    -0.26      -0.17    -0.17      -0.06     -0.53   
DI*D96  -0.25    -1.85 *  -0.86    -0.88      -0.15     -1.27   
DI*D97  -0.35    -2.51 ** -1.29    -1.28      -0.09     -0.68   
DI*D98  -0.29    -2.01 ** -0.69    -0.68      -0.16     -1.10   
DI*D99  -0.03    -0.23      -0.86    -0.84      -0.03     -0.24   
DI*D00  -0.27    -1.80 *  -0.44    -0.42      -0.17     -1.17   
Log (total assets) (LTA)  2.37    2.21 ** 8.08    1.30      2.60     1.60   
Intercept  -30.15    -1.79  *  -118.42    -1.23      -48.85     -0.75   
Overall R-squared  0.152   0.115   0.387  
Number of observations(Number of firms)  189(27)  189(27)  161(23) 
              
(3) Malaysia               
Dependent Variables      R O A        ROE          PMA     
    Coefficient   Z-Value     Coefficient   Z-Value     Coefficient    Z-Value   
Separation of voting rights and cash flow rights (DI)  0.48    1.96 ** 1.22    2.87 ***  0.12     0.10   
DI*D95  -0.01    -0.11      0.05    0.17      0.11     0.51   
DI*D96  0.01    0.05      0.01    0.03      0.06     0.28   
DI*D97  -0.06    -0.62      -0.23    -0.76      0.05     0.20   
DI*D98  -0.29    -2.68 *** -0.82    -2.67 ***  -0.48     -2.07 **
DI*D99  -0.27    -2.48 ** -0.80    -2.59 ***  -0.59     -2.53 **
DI*D00  -0.19    -1.77 *  -0.16    -0.51      -0.72     -3.12 ***
Log (total assets) (LTA)  -0.35    -0.33      2.30    1.39      -0.00    -0.00  
Intercept  2.42    0.21      -19.85    -1.63      6.91       0.15   
Overall R-squared  0.414   0.280   0.537  
Number of observations(Number of firms)  182(26)  217(31)  210(30) 
              
(4) Philippines               
Dependent Variables      R O A        ROE          PMA     
    Coefficient   Z-Value     Coefficient   Z-Value     Coefficient    Z-Value   
Separation of voting rights and cash flow rights (DI)  0.04    0.14      0.62    0.72      2.49       2.46 **
DI*D95  -0.01    -0.07      -0.13    -0.25      -0.24     -0.47   
DI*D96  0.18    1.05      -0.07    -0.13      -0.57     -1.05   
DI*D97  -0.02    -0.13      -0.78    -1.40      -1.09     -1.82 * 
DI*D98  -0.16    -0.81      -1.18    -2.06  **  -1.68     -2.63 ***
DI*D99  -0.46    -2.23 ** -1.22    -2.05  **  -2.19     -3.32 ***
DI*D00  -0.30    -1.32      -1.32    -2.05  **  -1.51     -2.06 **
Log (total assets) (LTA)  -2.29    -1.59      1.99    0.78      12.35     2.70 ***
Intercept  37.49    2.24  ** -9.91    -0.35      -110.02       -2.06  **
Overall R-squared  0.728   0.572   0.615  
Number of observations(Number of firms)  49(7)  42(6)  49(7) 
              
(5) Thailand               
Dependent Variables      R O A        ROE          PMA     
    Coefficient   Z-Value     Coefficient   Z-Value     Coefficient    Z-Value   
Separation of voting rights and cash flow rights (DI)  0.06    0.33      0.27    0.25      -0.00      -0.00  
DI*D95  -0.06    -0.31      -0.30    -0.27      -0.20     -0.33   
DI*D96  0.00    0.01      0.15    0.13      -0.36     -0.59   
DI*D97  -0.36    -1.73 *  -0.54    -0.48      -0.56     -0.92   
DI*D98  -0.16    -0.79      -0.07    -0.06      -0.75     -1.23   
DI*D99  0.03    0.15      -0.55    -0.48      -0.67     -1.10   
DI*D00  -0.06    -0.30      -0.43    -0.37      -0.28     -0.45   
Log (total assets) (LTA)  -0.85    -0.67      -4.98    -0.74      -2.35     -0.53   
Intercept  10.36    0.83      49.47    0.53      29.20       0.48   
Overall R-squared  0.314   0.172   0.109  
Number of observations(Number of firms)  42(6)  56(8)  63(9) 
(Note 1), regression results of Industry dummies as explanatory variables have been omitted.             
(Note 2), asterisks denote significance levels: * indicates significance at the 10% level, ** at the 5% level, *** at the 1% level.         
 
 







Table 4 The effect of Debt on Performance 
(1) Indonesia                   
                 
Panel A: full sample firms                 
Dependent Variables  ROA  ROE  PMA 
    Coefficient      Z-Value     Coefficient   Z-Value     Coefficient      Z-Value     
Debt ratio (DA-1)  -13.98     -3.03  *** 11.23    0.57      -2.51     -0.46   
DA-1*D95  0.63     0.19      0.11    0.01      0.60     0.15   
DA-1*D96  -1.60     -0.48      -4.53    -0.34      -2.92     -0.72   
DA-1*D97  -14.17     -4.14  *** -31.13    -2.25  **  -3.34     -0.77   
DA-1*D98  -15.99     -4.77  *** -69.47    -5.09  ***  -3.10     -0.72   
DA-1*D99  3.56     1.07      -2.09    -0.15      -5.71     -1.33   
DA-1*D00  -9.59     -2.83  *** -25.19    -1.81  *  -6.70     -1.53   
Log (total assets) (LTA)  0.42     0.50      2.79    0.84      0.43     0.35   
Intercept  15.08       1.30      -11.61    -0.23      2.50       0.56   
Overall R-squared  0.509   0.289   0.417  
Number of observations 
(Number of firms) 
455(65)  385(55)  441(63) 
                 
Panel B: high debt ratio firms                
Dependent Variables  ROA  ROE  PMA 
    Coefficient      Z-Value     Coefficient   Z-Value     Coefficient      Z-Value     
Debt ratio (DA-1)  -1.83     -0.15      53.88    0.91      11.73     1.02   
DA-1*D95  0.56     0.09      3.21    0.11      2.64     0.44   
DA-1*D96  -1.31     -0.21      4.68    0.16      -3.30     -0.51   
DA-1*D97  -11.90     -1.73  *  -17.39    -0.61      -4.13     -0.54   
DA-1*D98  -21.44     -2.85  *** -100.21    -3.57  ***  -0.76     -0.09   
DA-1*D99  -4.83     -0.64      11.19    0.40      -10.89     -1.27   
DA-1*D00  -12.06     -1.59      -24.88    -0.88      -9.19     -1.02   
Log(total assets) (LTA)  3.89     1.15      -8.45    -2.06  **  2.06     0.53   
Intercept  -38.58       -0.83      87.82    2.08  **  -22.00       -0.42   
Overall R-squared  0.382   0.335   0.493  
Number of observations 
(Number of firms) 
91(13)  77(11)  84(12) 
                 
Panel C: low debt ratio firms                 
Dependent Variables  ROA  ROE  PMA 
    Coefficient      Z-Value     Coefficient   Z-Value     Coefficient      Z-Value     
Debt ratio (DA-1)  -17.18     -1.28      -11.71    -0.47      -15.25     -0.62   
DA-1*D95  -3.07     -0.27      -20.03    -0.65      -1.87     -0.07   
DA-1*D96  -2.82     -0.27      -15.82    -0.59      0.48     0.02   
DA-1*D97  -13.75     -1.28      -53.51    -1.83  *  -14.85     -0.55   
DA-1*D98  -6.20     -0.61      -32.75    -1.30      -23.99     -1.03   
DA-1*D99  10.91     1.06      -18.390    -0.76      13.84     0.60   
DA-1*D00  -3.45     -0.33      -53.03    -2.10  **  7.16     0.31   
Log(total assets) (LTA)  -1.52     -1.64  *  9.67    1.58      2.59     0.42   
Intercept  33.03       2.76  *** -110.95    -1.19      -6.40       -0.07   
Overall R-squared  0.275   0.520   0.388  
Number of observations 
(Number of firms) 
91(13)  77(11)  84(12) 
(Note 1), regression results of Industry dummies as explanatory variables have been omitted.           
(Note 2), asterisks denote significance levels: * indicates significance at the 10% level, ** at the 5% level, *** at the 1% level.       











Table 4 The effect of Debt on Performance (continued) 
(2) Korea                   
                
Panel A: full sample firms                
Dependent Variables  ROA  ROE  PMA 
    Coefficient      Z-Value     Coefficient   Z-Value     Coefficient      Z-Value     
Debt ratio (DA-1)  -2.69     -1.46      18.12    1.11      0.01     0.01    
DA-1*D95  -0.16     -0.17      -2.02    -0.24      -1.62     -1.54    
DA-1*D96  -2.73     -2.95  *** -11.03    -1.32      -2.94     -2.79   *** 
DA-1*D97  -3.84     -4.16  *** -17.07    -2.05  ** -2.82     -2.66   *** 
DA-1*D98  -5.04     -5.54  *** -29.04    -3.55  *** -6.24     -5.95   *** 
DA-1*D99  -2.08     -2.26  ** -22.70    -2.73  *** -2.90     -2.75   *** 
DA-1*D00  -3.51     -3.72  *** -22.85    -2.68  *** -4.59     -4.29   *** 
Log (total assets) (LTA)  0.91     3.82  *** 1.23    0.62      1.38     4.25   *** 
Intercept  -3.67       -0.87      -24.51    -0.71      -6.86       -1.23    
Overall R-squared  0.221   0.116   0.330  
Number of observations 
(Number of firms) 
931(133)  973(139)  889(127) 
                
Panel B: high debt ratio firms               
Dependent Variables  ROA  ROE  PMA 
    Coefficient      Z-Value     Coefficient   Z-Value     Coefficient      Z-Value     
Debt ratio (DA-1)  0.03     0.01      120.97    1.31      18.40     2.42   ** 
DA-1*D95  0.32     0.22      -2.16    -0.09      -3.59     -1.25    
DA-1*D96  -0.49     -0.34      -8.33    -0.35      -3.81     -1.31    
DA-1*D97  -1.99     -1.37      -20.23    -0.84      -7.80     -2.64   *** 
DA-1*D98  -6.33     -4.37  *** -57.98    -2.39  ** -15.56     -5.35   *** 
DA-1*D99  -4.36     -3.01  *** -37.74    -1.58      -7.62     -2.61   *** 
DA-1*D00  -3.62     -2.51  ** -53.92    -2.24  ** -6.92     -2.38   ** 
Log(total assets) (LTA)  0.38     0.69      0.22    0.02      2.80     2.21   ** 
Intercept  1.51       0.17      -89.53    -0.60      -40.22       -2.04    
Overall R-squared  0.428   0.177   0.356  
Number of observations 
(Number of firms) 
182(26)  189(27)  175(25) 
                
Panel C: low debt ratio firms                
Dependent Variables  ROA  ROE  PMA 
    Coefficient      Z-Value     Coefficient   Z-Value     Coefficient      Z-Value     
Debt ratio (DA-1)  -10.22     -1.86  *  -31.64    -1.49      -4.70     -0.92    
DA-1*D95  -0.34     -0.11      -5.98    -0.39      -1.86     -0.60    
DA-1*D96  -5.08     -1.54      -18.86    -1.24      -5.49     -1.72   * 
DA-1*D97  -7.03     -2.11  ** -24.36    -1.62      -3.56     -1.12    
DA-1*D98  -6.54     -2.04  ** -22.39    -1.57      -3.89     -1.26    
DA-1*D99  -3.57     -1.07      -36.15    -2.51  ** -3.79     -1.19    
DA-1*D00  -0.16     -0.05      -9.05    -0.63      -14.59     -4.60   *** 
Log(total assets) (LTA)  0.53     0.50      6.30    4.09  *** 2.23     2.76   *** 
Intercept  2.72       0.14      -57.93    -2.51  ** -16.19       -1.07    
Overall R-squared  0.235   0.148   0.475  
Number of observations 
(Number of firms) 
182(26)  189(27)  175(25) 
(Note 1), regression results of Industry dummies as explanatory variables have been 
omitted.  
         










Table 4 The effect of Debt on Performance (continued) 
 
(3) Malaysia                   
                  
Panel A: full sample firms                                      
Dependent Variables  ROA  ROE  PMA 
    Coefficient      Z-Value     Coefficient   Z-Value     Coefficient      Z-Value     
Debt ratio (DA-1)  -0.44     -0.25      10.31    2.41  ** -6.13     -1.65   * 
DA-1*D95  -1.42     -1.05      -0.30    -0.09      0.45     0.17    
DA-1*D96  -2.13     -1.54      -5.22    -1.48      -1.39     -0.51    
DA-1*D97  -6.78     -4.86  *** -16.71    -4.76  *** -4.52     -1.62    
DA-1*D98  -13.82     -9.99  *** -35.09    -10.09  *** -17.74     -6.44   ***
DA-1*D99  -11.09     -8.17  *** -28.52    -8.29  *** -19.94     -7.36   ***
DA-1*D00  -10.34     -7.65  *** -24.63    -7.17  *** -15.23     -5.61   ***
Log (total assets) (LTA)  0.16     0.49      1.64    2.44  ** 2.61     3.15   ***
Intercept  2.25       0.77      0.72    0.11      -0.93       -0.10    
Overall R-squared  0.434   0.348   0.439  
Number of observations 
(Number of firms) 
1099(157)  1148(164)  1127(161) 
                  
Panel B: high debt ratio firms               
Dependent Variables  ROA  ROE  PMA 
    Coefficient      Z-Value     Coefficient   Z-Value     Coefficient      Z-Value     
Debt ratio (DA-1)  -2.54     -0.65      14.25    1.20      -3.14     -0.37    
DA-1*D95  -0.13     -0.07      -1.55    -0.27      0.76     0.19    
DA-1*D96  -1.56     -0.77      -6.42    -1.08      -1.13     -0.27    
DA-1*D97  -2.15     -1.03      -13.06    -2.13  ** -5.33     -1.25    
DA-1*D98  -6.70     -3.21  *** -30.75    -5.01  *** -16.48     -3.87   ***
DA-1*D99  -7.34     -3.52  *** -31.17    -5.06  *** -25.84     -6.05   ***
DA-1*D00  -4.88     -2.37  ** -21.59    -3.56  *** -13.65     -3.19   ***
Log(total assets) (LTA)  0.19     0.32      3.36    1.82  *  5.29     4.16   ***
Intercept  7.28       1.17      -17.12    -1.03      -25.05       -2.11    
Overall R-squared  0.293   0.417   0.465  
Number of observations 
(Number of firms) 
217(31)  224(32)  224(32) 
                  
Panel C: low debt ratio firms                
Dependent Variables  ROA  ROE  PMA 
    Coefficient      Z-Value     Coefficient   Z-Value     Coefficient      Z-Value     
Debt ratio (DA-1)  5.67     1.20      23.13    1.64      2.48     0.21    
DA-1*D95  -2.14     -0.42      -1.18    -0.07      5.23     0.44    
DA-1*D96  -4.91     -0.96      -3.41    -0.18      3.02     0.26    
DA-1*D97  -8.89     -1.16      -25.14    -1.07      3.64     0.26    
DA-1*D98  -23.13     -3.99  *** -52.12    -3.04  *** -2.11     -0.18    
DA-1*D99  -14.71     -2.79  *** -42.51    -2.72  *** -8.19     -0.75    
DA-1*D00  -27.17     -5.14  *** -13.59    -0.91  ** -30.61     -2.79   ***
Log(total assets) (LTA)  2.05     2.99  *** 4.38    2.63  *** 0.29     0.17    
Intercept  -0.50       -0.19      -26.00    -1.72  *  11.84       0.99    
Overall R-squared  0.394   0.203   0.525  
Number of observations 
(Number of firms) 
217(31)  224(32)  224(32) 
(Note 1), regression results of Industry dummies as explanatory variables have been omitted.             
(Note 2), asterisks denote significance levels: * indicates significance at the 10% level, ** at the 5% level, *** at the 1% level.       












Table 4 The effect of Debt on Performance (continued) 
(4) Philippines                   
                  
Panel A: full sample firms                  
Dependent Variables     R O A         ROE          PMA       
    Coefficient      Z-Value     Coefficient   Z-Value     Coefficient      Z-Value     
Debt ratio (DA-1)  9.62     2.59  *** 39.66    5.79  *** 9.96     1.16    
DA-1*D95  -2.17     -0.89      -9.91    -2.10  ** -0.04     -0.01    
DA-1*D96  -2.86     -1.17      -12.40    -2.65  *** -2.06     -0.47    
DA-1*D97  -5.63     -2.28  ** -24.11    -5.18  *** -4.32     -0.95    
DA-1*D98  -8.42     -3.50  *** -27.80    -6.08  *** -17.45     -3.95   ***
DA-1*D99  -11.19     -4.61  *** -32.81    -7.12  *** -21.17     -4.74   ***
DA-1*D00  -9.24     -3.85  *** -28.04    -6.19  *** -15.34     -3.39   ***
Log (total assets) (LTA)  -0.04     -0.06      1.06    1.02      1.22     0.91    
Intercept  1.81       0.41      -2.50    -0.32      19.93       1.79   * 
Overall R-squared  0.410   0.533   0.616  
Number of observations 
(Number of firms) 
322(46)  280(40)  252(36) 
                  
Panel B: high debt ratio firms               
Dependent Variables     R O A           ROE          PMA       
    Coefficient      Z-Value     Coefficient   Z-Value     Coefficient      Z-Value     
Debt ratio (DA-1)  -22.54     -4.67  *** 32.15    0.69      -135.27     -1.83   * 
DA-1*D95  -0.61     -0.75      -9.07    -2.44  ** -1.68     -0.29    
DA-1*D96  0.03     0.03      -7.54    -2.00  ** -0.55     -0.10    
DA-1*D97  -1.25     -1.49      -18.86    -4.92  *** -3.79     -0.65    
DA-1*D98  -2.37     -2.86  *** -20.43    -5.38  *** -16.76     -2.89   ***
DA-1*D99  -3.89     -4.60  *** -25.24    -6.41  *** -20.05     -3.38   ***
DA-1*D00  -3.03     -3.58  *** -20.62    -5.21  *** -11.59     -1.95   * 
Log(total assets) (LTA)  -0.22     -1.01      0.84    0.74      -1.32     -0.79    
Intercept  25.55       6.91  *** -13.27    -0.30      139.79       1.95   * 
Overall R-squared  0.596   0.726   0.660  
Number of observations 
(Number of firms) 
63(9)  56(8)  49(7) 
                  
Panel C: low debt ratio firms               
Dependent Variables     R O A           ROE          PMA       
    Coefficient      Z-Value     Coefficient   Z-Value     Coefficient      Z-Value     
Debt ratio (DA-1)  -3.38     -0.35      22.58    1.04      8.57     0.34    
DA-1*D95  2.54     0.17      14.48    0.53      -7.83     -0.28    
DA-1*D96  13.47     0.93      48.43    1.74      -32.65     -1.33    
DA-1*D97  16.45     0.72      52.52    1.30      -54.56     -1.73   * 
DA-1*D98  3.66     0.26      15.65    0.61      -74.63     -2.95   ***
DA-1*D99  4.00     0.36      8.83    0.38      -35.91     -1.59    
DA-1*D00  12.03     1.26      23.87    1.12      -15.81     -0.72    
Log(total assets) (LTA)  -2.66     -2.38  ** -3.47    -1.76  *  1.88     1.04    
Intercept  19.02       2.53  ** 24.75    1.84  *  -1.35       -0.08    
Overall R-squared  0.647   0.595   0.246  
Number of observations 
(Number of firms) 
63(9)  56(8)  49(7) 
(Note 1), regression results of Industry dummies as explanatory variables have been omitted.         
(Note 2), asterisks denote significance levels: * indicates significance at the 10% level, ** at the 5% level, *** at the 1% level.      











Table 4 The effect of Debt on Performance (continued) 
(5) Thailand                   
                  
Panel A: full sample firms                  
Dependent Variables     R O A         ROE          PMA       
    Coefficient      Z-Value     Coefficient   Z-Value     Coefficient      Z-Value     
Debt ratio (DA-1)  6.36     2.78  *** 54.17    4.94  *** 17.70     4.63   ***
DA-1*D95  -1.32     -0.75      -9.14    -1.08      -2.41     -0.94    
DA-1*D96  -4.72     -2.73  *** -18.50    -2.22  ** -7.19     -2.84   ***
DA-1*D97  -31.92     -18.50  *** -37.13    -4.47  *** -15.99     -6.31   ***
DA-1*D98  -4.71     -2.88  *** -41.15    -5.22  *** -22.27     -9.14   ***
DA-1*D99  -10.04     -6.08  *** -44.21    -5.55  *** -25.30     -10.40   ***
DA-1*D00  -7.86     -4.72  *** -37.93    -4.73  *** -17.52     -7.16   ***
Log (total assets) (LTA)  0.87     1.86  *  2.45    1.21      1.77     1.86   * 
Intercept  -2.39       -0.65      -22.22    -1.37      -4.61       -0.61    
Overall R-squared  0.478   0.226   0.408  
Number of observations 
(Number of firms) 
1008(144)  1043(149)  1064(152) 
                  
Panel B: high debt ratio firms               
Dependent Variables     R O A           ROE          PMA       
    Coefficient      Z-Value     Coefficient   Z-Value     Coefficient      Z-Value     
Debt ratio (DA-1)  9.41     1.41      116.03    3.06  *** 29.44     2.66   ***
DA-1*D95  -0.99     -0.26      -5.24    -0.26      -3.97     -0.57    
DA-1*D96  -1.96     -0.52      -13.39    -0.67      -7.11     -1.03    
DA-1*D97  -29.70     -7.97  *** -36.23    -1.81  *  -19.50     -2.85   ***
DA-1*D98  -5.09     -1.35      -89.29    -4.50  *** -33.54     -5.00   ***
DA-1*D99  -8.86     -2.37  ** -53.20    -2.70  *** -42.99     -6.39   ***
DA-1*D00  -8.08     -2.17  ** -35.54    -1.80  *  -22.95     -3.40   ***
Log(total assets) (LTA)  -0.43     -1.02      -6.00    -3.02  *** -1.66     -2.44   ** 
Intercept  3.57       0.68      -8.27    -0.31      7.10       0.77    
Overall R-squared  0.354   0.150   0.272  
Number of observations 
(Number of firms) 
196(28)  203(29)  210(30) 
                  
Panel C: low debt ratio firms               
Dependent Variables     R O A           ROE          PMA       
    Coefficient      Z-Value     Coefficient   Z-Value     Coefficient      Z-Value     
Debt ratio (DA-1)  18.41     3.45  *** 26.50    1.71  *  25.53     2.59   ***
DA-1*D95  -4.12     -0.82      -10.37    -0.72      -5.15     -0.66    
DA-1*D96  -13.00     -2.69  *** -22.04    -1.58      -16.72     -2.24   ** 
DA-1*D97  -40.33     -7.91  *** -50.50    -3.34  *** -27.00     -3.44   ***
DA-1*D98  -15.33     -3.22  *** -60.02    -4.35  *** -37.57     -5.21   ***
DA-1*D99  -19.43     -3.79  *** -58.93    -4.00  *** -37.13     -4.96   ***
DA-1*D00  -14.29     -2.85  *** -46.83    -3.23  *** -26.96     -3.59   ***
Log(total assets) (LTA)  3.24     3.15  *** -1.03    -0.35      2.03     0.96    
Intercept  -24.30     -2.42  ** 20.29    0.70      -3.60       -0.28    
Overall R-squared  0.577   0.490   0.441  
Number of observations 
(Number of firms) 
196(28)  203(29)  210(30) 
(Note 1), regression results of Industry dummies as explanatory variables have been omitted.         
(Note 2), asterisks denote significance levels: * indicates significance at the 10% level, ** at the 5% level, *** at the 1% level.       













Table 5 The effect of Diversification on Performance  
 
 
 (1) Indonesia             
dent Variables     R O A       ROE          PMA      
    Coefficient    Z-Value     Coefficient   Z-Value     Coefficient      Z-Value    
Number of segment (NS)  -0.20     -0.25      0.01    0.20      1.23     1.50   
NS*D95  0.05     0.10      -0.00   -0.08      -0.01     -0.02   
NS*D96  -0.30     -0.61      -0.00   -0.25      -0.29     -0.64   
NS*D97  -2.15     -4.22 *** -0.03    -1.65 *  -0.26     -0.51   
NS*D98  -1.87     -3.58 *** -0.06    -2.98 *** -0.06     -0.12   
NS*D99  0.17     0.34      -0.00   -0.04      -0.90     -1.74 * 
NS*D00  -1.86     -3.55 *** -0.03    -1.21      -0.96     -1.81 * 
Log (total assets) (LTA)  -1.38     -1.49      -0.01    -0.19      -1.02     -0.89   
Intercept  31.99     1.97  ** 0.46    0.77      22.26     1.36   
Overall R-squared  0.388   0.186   0.400  
Number of observations(Number of firms)  511(73)  399(57)  483(69) 
             
(2) Korea                 
Dependent Variables     R O A         ROE          PMA      
    Coefficient    Z-Value     Coefficient   Z-Value     Coefficient      Z-Value    
Number of segment (NS)  0.39     1.36      0.01    0.53      0.21     0.64   
NS*D95  -0.03     -0.16      -0.00   -0.20      -0.24     -1.13   
NS*D96  -0.43     -2.56 *** -0.02    -1.06      -0.51     -2.36 **
NS*D97  -0.75     -4.36 *** -0.03    -1.72 *  -0.61     -2.76 ***
NS*D98  -0.91     -5.30 *** -0.05    -3.15 *** -1.62     -7.39 ***
NS*D99  -0.27     -1.57      -0.01    -0.96      -0.61     -2.77 ***
NS*D00  -0.71     -4.09 *** -0.04    -2.47 ** -0.52     -2.37 **
Log (total assets) (LTA)  1.16     4.02 *** 0.01    0.28      1.26     3.81 ***
Intercept  -11.43     -2.29  ** -0.07    -0.22      -6.37     -1.08   
Overall R-squared  0.196   0.103   0.279  
Number of observations(Number of firms)  952(136)  1008(144)  1141(163) 
             
(3) Malaysia                 
Dependent Variables     R O A         ROE          PMA      
    Coefficient    Z-Value     Coefficient   Z-Value     Coefficient      Z-Value    
Number of segment (NS)  0.17     0.62      0.01    1.24      -0.82     -1.10   
NS*D95  -0.15     -1.32      0.00    0.23      -0.08     -0.35   
NS*D96  -0.26     -2.22 ** -0.00   -1.14      -0.30     -1.31   
NS*D97  -0.72     -5.86 *** -0.01    -4.05 *** -0.75     -3.12 ***
NS*D98  -1.41     -11.43 *** -0.03    -8.90 *** -2.01     -8.30 ***
NS*D99  -1.21     -9.86 *** -0.02    -6.76 *** -2.17     -9.03 ***
NS*D00  -1.25     -10.20 *** -0.02    -7.46 *** -2.17     -9.03 ***
Log (total assets) (LTA)  0.58     1.41      0.02    2.04 ** 3.61     4.38 ***
Intercept  2.39     0.66      0.01    0.11      -4.30     -0.45   
Overall R-squared  0.437   0.321   0.406  
Number of observations(Number of firms)  1106(158)  1155(165)  1246(178) 
             
(4) Philippines                 
Dependent Variables     R O A         ROE          PMA      
    Coefficient    Z-Value     Coefficient   Z-Value     Coefficient      Z-Value    
Number of segment (NS)  1.43     2.10 ** 0.03    2.21 ** 3.24     1.42   
NS*D95  -0.43     -1.50      -0.01    -2.19 ** 0.16     0.27   
NS*D96  -0.57     -1.93 *  -0.02    -2.77 *** -0.31     -0.51   
NS*D97  -1.01     -3.33 *** -0.03    -4.74 *** -0.48     -0.74   
NS*D98  -1.31     -4.28 *** -0.03    -4.81 *** -1.76     -2.70 ***
NS*D99  -1.70     -5.51 *** -0.04    -5.64 *** -2.07     -3.14 ***
NS*D00  -1.67     -5.39 *** -0.03    -5.25 *** -1.60     -2.36 **
Log (total assets) (LTA)  0.18     0.27      0.02    1.28      -0.55     -0.36   
Intercept  -1.37     -0.22      -0.05    -0.50      26.97     1.61   
Overall R-squared  0.447   0.476   0.656  
Number of observations(Number of firms)  322(46)  280(40)  280(40) 
             
(5) Thailand                 
Dependent Variables     R O A         ROE          PMA      
    Coefficient    Z-Value     Coefficient   Z-Value     Coefficient      Z-Value    
Number of segment (NS)  1.39     3.13 *** 0.06    3.28 *** 0.91     1.24   
NS*D95  -0.24     -0.79      -0.01    -0.92      -0.32     -0.69   
NS*D96  -0.68     -2.27 ** -0.02    -1.53      -0.87     -1.87 * 
NS*D97  -4.66     -15.50 *** -0.05    -3.22 *** -2.15     -4.60 ***
NS*D98  -0.83     -2.79 *** -0.03    -2.10 ** -2.78     -6.00 ***
NS*D99  -1.49     -4.99 *** -0.02    -1.58      -2.71     -5.85 ***
NS*D00  -1.09     -3.67 *** -0.04    -2.97 *** -2.10     -4.54 ***
Log (total assets) (LTA)  0.32     0.51      0.01    0.52      0.74     0.78   
Intercept  2.04     0.33      -0.06    -0.35      5.29     0.73   
Overall R-squared  0.404   0.195   0.367  
Number of observations(Number of firms)  1050(150)  1057(151)  1148(164) 
(Note 1), regression results of Industry dummies as explanatory variables have been omitted.             
(Note 2), asterisks denote significance levels: * indicates significance at the 10% level, ** at the 5% level, *** at the 1% level.     
             
 